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Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses in
Broker-Investor Contracts: Are Investors Protected?
On Monday October 19, 1987, now known as "black Monday,"
the Dow Jones Industrial Average tumbled 508 points and the market
lost over 20 percent of its value. 1 Not since the stock market crash of
the great depression 2 have investors lost such huge sums of money. 3
Yet, money is made and lost every day on Wall Street. When money is
made, investors congratulate themselves on their astute business decisions. When money is lost, however, investors look for someone to
blame. Many times the blame, justly or unjustly, falls on the broker
that purchased the slumping securities.
In order to avoid potential litigation, brokerage houses include arbitration clauses in their form contracts signed by investors.• Although
arbitration clauses have long been standard in broker/investor contracts, their enforceability has long been in question.
Congress, favoring the use of arbitration, passed the United States
Arbitration Act11 which makes pre-dispute arbitration clauses specifically enforceable. 6 Yet, at one time, the Arbitration Act did not apply to
causes of action brought under the Securities Act of 193Y or the Secur1. Wall St.]., Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
The Stock Market Crashed as panic selling swept the Dow Jones industriales down
508.00 points or 22.6o/o, to 1738.74. The record decline far exceeded the drop on Oct.
28, 1929, when the average slid 12.8%. Most other market indicators also skidded to
record lows, as Big Board volume soared to 604.3 million shares, well above the previous record.

/d.

2. "On Oct. 28, 1929, the stock market fell 12.8%, ushering in the Great Depression." /d. at
1, col. 5.
3. It has been estimated that investors lost about $500 billion on October 19, 1987. /d.
"When the stock market drops by $1 trillion-which is roughly how far all the stocks on the
New York Stock Exchange have fallen in less than two months-that plunge is enough to wipe
out decades of savings." N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
4. A typical arbitration clause states:
Any controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of or relating to this
contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the
rules, then obtaining, of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the state of New York, or the American Arbitration Association, or the Board
of Arbitration of the New York Stock Exchange, as the undersigned may elect.
Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 125 (1977) (quoting
8 C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FoRMS ANNOTATED§ 8.1710, at 921 (1973)).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) [hereinafter Arbitration Act].
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (limited to contracts in interstate commerce; effectively any contract).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) [hereinafter Securities Act].
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1t1es Exchange Act of 1934. 8 The Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,& however, now makes it
clear that if a broker /investor contract contains a governing pre-dispute
arbitration clause, all disputes arising under the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act must be resolved through binding arbitration. 10
Impelled by the stock market crash in October and the Supreme
Court Ruling in McMahon, "thousands of investors are filing for arbitration"11 to resolve differences between themselves and their brokers.
Because of this sudden increase in the use of arbitration as an alternative to litigation, guidance in this area is needed now more than ever.
The purpose of this article is to examine the real and perceived
problems now present in the securities arbitration system and suggest
ways to improve the system. This article concludes by evaluating recommendations made by the Securities Exchange Commission that are
designed to ensure the protection of investors.
l.

A.

BACKGROUND

Statutory Law

Historically, courts viewed arbitration to be an inferior method of
settling disputes. 12 Congress, however, believing that arbitration was a
viable means of settling disputes between parties, passed the Arbitration Act 13 which instituted a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements. " 14
The Arbitration Act provides that arbitration clauses "shall be
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
The Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), held that a claim brought under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 was not subject to a pre-dispute arbitration clause
contained in a contract signed by the parties. After Wilko, courts consistently held agreements to
arbitrate disputes under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act equally invalid. T. HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.4, at 531 (1985).
9. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
10. Although the Supreme Court in McMahon did not overrule Wilko, it appears that if the
issue in Wilko were brought before the Court today, Wilko would be overruled. See infra notes 49
and 50.
11. Salwen, Investors Swamp Securities-Arbitration System, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at
39, col. 3:
The New Yark Stock Exchange estimates that since October about 120 cases have been
filed every month-a 60o/o increase from year-earlier levels. The National Association
of Securities Dealers says that 1987 cases grew 82% over the 1986 level and that this
year's pace is running an annualized 45% higher.
12. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (This hostility began with the
English courts and was adopted by the American courts). Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes
Through The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393 (1987).
13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
14. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hasp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983).
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valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."u The Act goes on
to provide that courts "shall on application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement .... ms Moreover, courts are required
to issue orders compelling arbitration when a valid agreement is
found. 17
"The Arbitration Act . . . was designed to allow parties to avoid
'the costliness and delays of litigation,' and to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts . . . . ms While predispute arbitration agreements at one time were revokable at will, 19 the
Arbitration Act creates a presumption favoring arbitration agreements,
and "doubts about the scope of arbitration [are to be] resolved in favor
of arbitration." 20
Conflicts, however, may arise between the Arbitration Act and
other congressional acts. An example of this conflict arises when a court
is faced with a choice between enforcing an arbitration clause under the
Arbitration Act and enforcing the judicial forum requirement granted
under the Securities Act 21 and the Exchange Act. 22 Both Acts give
courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under each Act. 28 Both
Acts also prohibit the waiver of compliance with any of the Acts' provisions,24 including the waiver of the judicial forum requirement. A predispute arbitration agreement is arguably a waiver of the judicial forum
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
18. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., , 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1944) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924)).
19. Comment, Arbitrability of Implied Rights of Action Under Section IO(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 506, 510 (1986) (and sources cited therein).
20. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982); Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1957); Katsoris, Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FoRDHAM L. REV. 279, 294 (1984).
23. Section 27 of the Exchange Act confers jurisdiction of violations of the Exchange Act on
the district courts of the United States.
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any Territory
or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter of the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). Section 22 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982), contains a
similar provision.
24. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982), voids "[a]ny condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or any rule of an exchange required thereby .
. . ."Section 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982), contains similar language.
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requirement under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. If this is
so, the anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, would be in direct conflict with the Arbitration Act which mandates enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The following section traces the history of the Supreme Court's resolution of this conflict.

B.

judicial History: From Wilko to McMahon

The Supreme Court's view, as to whether pre-dispute arbitration
clauses between securities brokers and investors are enforceable has
changed completely, from holding that arbitration clauses were unenforceable in Wilko 211 to virtually overruling Wilko and declaring arbitration clauses enforceable in McMahon. 26
Wilko 27 dealt with a dispute between a brokerage firm and an investor. The Court, faced with the apparent conflict between the Arbitration Act and the Securities Act, had to decide whether claims
brought under section 12(2) of the Securities Act 28 should be subject to
compulsory arbitration. The brokerage firm sought to enforce the predispute arbitration agreement by moving to have the trial stayed under
section 3 of the Arbitration Act. 29 The Supreme Court ruled against
the brokerage firm's motion noting that section 22(a) of the Securities
Act 30 gave the federal courts jurisdiction over claims brought under the
Securities Act. 31 In addition, the Court noted that section 14 of the
Securities Act 32 prohibited the waiver of any section of the Securities
Act. 33 The Court held that the arbitration clause contained in the contract was an attempt to waive the choice of forums provided under section 22(a) of the Securities Act, 34 and was therefore void. 311
In Wilko, the Court expressed its displeasure with arbitration in
general, listing several ways in which arbitration was inferior to judicial proceedings. 36 Since Wilko the Court's view of arbitration has
25. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
26. See infra notes 49 and 50 and accompanying text.
27. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
28. "Any person who offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact ...
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him .... " 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
33. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
35. "[T]he right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived
under § 14 of the Securities Act." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36 (lack of judicial review, arbitrators' lack of judicial training,
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evolved to the point of accepting arbitration as a favorable means of
dispute resolution. The Supreme Court's decision in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 37 marked a pronounced change in the Court's view of arbitration from being an inadequate form of dispute resolution, 38 to adopting a liberal policy favoring
arbitration agreements 39 and finding arbitration completely desirable. 40
Although Moses H. Cone did not involve a securities claim, it did
rule on the enforceability of a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained
in a construction contract signed by the parties. The Court held the
Arbitration Act established, "as a matter of federal law," that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability." 41
The Court's new-found acceptance of arbitration led to other decisions that consistently favored arbitration as a valid means of dispute
resolution. 42 Nevertheless, Wilko had not been overruled, and therefore,
arbitration not suited for subjective findings that must be made).
37. 460 U.S. 1 (1 983).
38. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 43S.
39. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
40. /d.
41. /d.
42. The Court began to modify Wilko in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. S06 (1974).
The dispute in Scherk arose out of the alleged breach of a sales contract. The contract signed by
the parties contained an agreement to arbitrate any future disputes between the parties before the
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France. After allegedly discovering that trademarks
purported to have been unencumbered by Scherk were in fact substantially encumbered, AlbertoCulver brought suit claiming violations of Rule lOb-S promulgated under§ lO(b) of the Exchange
Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court distinguished the case from Wilko on the grounds that the
"contract to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was a truly international agreement" which "involve[d] considerations and policies significantly different from those found controlling in Wilko." 417 U.S. at SlS.
Although the Court in Scherk upheld a pre-dispute arbitration clause in a dispute involving a
Rule lOb-S claim, the Court failed to explicitly hold that Wilko did not apply to all Rule lOb-S
causes of action. The Court's holding appeared to create only a small "international" exception to
the Wilko doctrine. Mansbach v. Prescorr, Ball & Turben, S98 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979)
(Scherk is a "narrow exception to Wilko for cases concerning international securities transactions"); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. Inc., v. Moore, S90 F. Supp. 26S, 268 (W.O. Tex.
1974) (Scherk is a "narrow exception to the Wilko holding, and is applicable only to international
transactions.").
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 46S U.S. 1 (1984) the Court held that the Arbitration Act
preempts any state statute with which it is in conflict. The Court stated that "Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."
46S U.S. at 10.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (198S) the Court held that the "Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of
the parties files a motion to compel, even when the result would be the possibly inefficient mainte-
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seemed to govern many causes of action brought under the Securities
Act or the Exchange Act. The recent decision in McMahon, however,
makes it clear that pre-dispute arbitration clauses do apply to disputes
involving securities claims in spite of the holding in Wilko:u
The issue in McMahon was whether a claim brought under Rule
lOb-S (promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act) 44 was
subject to the pre-dispute arbitration clauses contained in two broker/
investor agreements. 45 In the complaint, the McMahons alleged that
Shearson, through one of its brokers, had violated Rule 1Ob-5 46 by "engaging in fraudulent, excessive trading on respondents' accounts and by
making false statements and omitting material facts from the advice
given to respondents." 47 Once again, the Supreme Court faced a conflict between the Arbitration Act and the Exchange Act. The Court
stayed the trial pending the outcome of arbitration. The Court examined the Wilko holding and concluded that "Wilko must be understood ... as holding that the plaintiffs waiver of the 'right to select the
judicial forum,' was unenforceable only because arbitration was judged
inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by section 12(2) [of
the Securities Act of 1933)."48
Although the Court did not explicitly overrule Wilko, the opinion
has effectively been gutted and has, practically speaking, been overnance of separate proceedings in different forums." 470 U.S. at 217.
In Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) the Court held that
an "American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when
that agreement arises from an international transaction." 473 U.S. at 624.
43. See infra notes 49 and 50 and accompanying text.
44. Rule 1Ob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(a)
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course or business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
45. McMahon, 107 S.Ct. at 2335. The Court also addressed a second issue of whether a
claim brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), was also
subject to the arbitration agreement. Because the RICO claim is beyond the scope of this article it
will not be considered. It was, however, found that the RICO claim was subject to the arbitration
agreement. /d. at 2346.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
47. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2336.
48. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
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ruled. 49 Since the Court declined to explicitly overrule Wilko, it could
be argued that claims brought under section 12(2) of the Securities Act
are not subject to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The language of
the Court in McMahon, however, appears to indicate that claims under
section 12(2) will be subject to arbitration in the future. 110 By overruling the Court's rational in Wilko, McMahon has left nothing of substance in the Wilko opinion. If decided today, Wilko would likely be
decided in favor of arbitration.

II.

PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY

Prior to McMahon, pre-dispute arbitration clauses were thought
to be unenforceable. Investors could bring securities claims in federal
court regardless of the existence of an arbitration clause. 111 With the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in McMahon, however, the use of
arbitration has increased. Consequently, much more stress and responsibility is being placed on the securities arbitration system. 112 Because
arbitration is fast becoming the only resort investors have against securities violations by broker-dealers, the SEC must reevaluate the arbitration system to determine whether it ensures investor protection consistent with the purpose of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 53
49. "[T]he Court effectively overrules Wilko by accepting ... the position that arbitration
procedures in the securities industry and the Commission's oversight of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have improved greatly since Wilko was decided." ld. at 2346 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
50. The Court did not get to the exact issue decided in Wilko and therefore refused to reverse
the Wilko decision. However, the Court states:
[T)he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is
difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time.
This is especially so in light of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of
the securities laws. Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration were valid at the
time Wilko was decided, most certainly they do not hold true today for arbitration
procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority.
ld. at 2341.
51. See Securities Exchange Act Rei. No. 15948, (1979, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 82,122;
Rule 15c2-2, 17 CFR § 240.15c2-2 (1986) (stating the SEC's belief that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements were unenforceable).
52. Securities and Exchange Commission letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director, to all
members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), Sept. 10, 1987 at 1 (hereinafter SEC Letter) ("[R]ecent cases upholding predispute arbitration agreements together with
increasing post-dispute selection of sponsored arbitration suggest that SRO-sponsored arbitration
may become the primary forum for the resolution of disputes between broker-dealers and
investors.").
"Spurred by last October's debacle and [the McMahon decision], thousands of investors are
filing for arbitration-the investment industry's answer to the court system and most investors'
sole form of recourse when they believe they have been wronged." Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at
39, col. 3.
53. "[T)he Securities Act of 1933 was '[d]esigned to protect investors" and to require "issu-
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Problems in the arbitration system both actual and perceived could mhibit the system's ability to protect investors.

A.

Substantive Problems With Arbitration

1.

Arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts

The arbitration of securities disputes is a proceeding where the
parties involved contractually agree to submit their contentions to arbitrators selected by the parties.'14 One of the keys to fairness in arbitration is that the parties may freely bargain for the exact form of arbitration with which each party feels comfortable. When arbitration is
forced on an unwilling party, however, the fairness gained from the
free bargaining process is lost.
One way arbitration may be forced on a party is through the use
of an adhesion contract. Adhesion contracts occur when one party having a distinct bargaining disadvantage must either accept or reject the
terms of the contract without negotiation. 1111 An issue of adhesion frequently arises in standardized contracts, such as those drawn up by
brokerage houses for wide-spread use in customer agreements. Because
the contract is offered on a take it or leave it basis, investors are unable
ers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sale,' by creating 'a special right to
recover for misrepresentation ... .'" Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512 (quoting
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431); McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2346 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Both
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted to protect investors from predatory behavior of securities industry personnel."). See, e.g., Comment, The Preclusive Effect of Arbitral Determinations in Subsequent Federal Securities Litigation, 55 FoRDHAM
L. REv. 655, 668 n.1 (1987).
54. M. DoMKE, DoMKE ON CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:01 (rev. ed.)(quoting Gates v.
Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1939)) ("[A]rbitration is a contractual
proceeding, whereby the parties to any controversy or dispute ... select judges of their own choice
and by consent submit their controversy to such judges for determination, in the place of the
tribunals provided by the ordinary processes of law.")
55. Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining power.
The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to
shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a
monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His
contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the
stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood only in a vague way, if
at all. Thus, standardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion ....
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv.
629, 632 (1943).
Adhesion contract is a handy shorthand descriptive of standard form printed contracts
prepared by one party and submitted to the other on a 'take it or leave it' basis. The
law has recognized there is often no true equality of bargaining power in such contracts
and has accommodated that reality in construing them.
M. DoMKE, DoMKE ON CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5:04 (rev. ed.) (quoting Standard Oil of
California v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1965)).
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to bargain for favorable arbitration rules. Thus, investors are bound to
the arbitration rules dictated by the broker-dealer and the fairness
gained from free bargaining is lost.
The inability of investors to negotiate for arbitration rules takes
away an investor's ability to choose the most favorable method of dispute resolution. Because arbitration should be an optional procedure,
not a mandatory one, an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract may
be seen as a "theoretical inconsistency." 66 Arbitration should be a voluntary means of solving disputes. 67 It should not be coerced.
"[A]dvocates of arbitration continue to stress that parties should agree
to arbitrate conflicts arising between them on a wholly voluntary basis .
. Yet, voluntariness and equality of bargaining power have no place
in [adhesion] contracts . . . ." 68
As a matter of contract law, however, an adhesion contract is not
always unenforceable. 69 In fact, standardized contracts are very important in business, eliminating duplicative work and enabling a more confident allocation of risks assumed by the parties. 60 Only two basic limitations on the enforceability of an adhesion contract exist. First, if a
provision in an adhesion contract does not fall within the reasonable
expectations of the non-drafting party, the provision will not be enforced against him. 61 Because of the widespread use of arbitration
clauses in securities contracts an investor would presumably have a reasonable expectation that such provisions would be included. 62 Consequently, this limitation may not be applicable to an investor when he
has a reasonable expectation that the clause would be provided. Second,
even if the provision is within the reasonable expectation of the parties,
it will not be enforced if it is oppressive or unconscionable. 63 A finding
of oppression or unconscionability in a pre-dispute arbitration clause
may be unlikely considering the Court's favorable view of arbitration.
On the other hand, denial of access to the courts caused by an investor's
56. Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33 ARB. J. 41, 41 (1978).
57. M. DoMKE, DoMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION§ 1:01 (Rev. Ed.) ("An arbitration
can validly take place only if the parties have specifically and expressly agreed to use this method
for the settlement of their disputes."); Goldberg, A Supreme Court judge Looks at Arbitration, 20
ARB.]. 13, 16 (1965) ("Voluntary arbitration must be voluntary in a real and genuine sense.")
(emphasis in original).
58. Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33 ARB. J. 41, 41 (1978).
59. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 295 (1982).
60. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM.
L. REv. 629, 631 (1943) (citing "standard clauses in insurance policies [as] the most striking
illustrations of successful attempts on the part of business enterprises to select and control risks
assumed under a contract").
61. Katsoris, supra note 22, at 279, 306.
62. See id. at 292 n.86.
63. Katsoris, id. at 307.
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involuntary acceptance of an arbitration provision could be considered
oppressive. 64
Additionally, it has been argued that contracts between brokers
and investors are not adhesion contracts because not all brokerage
houses require investors to sign contracts which include arbitration
clauses. 611 If arbitration clauses are not included in all securities contracts, investors could seek brokerage houses that use contracts that do
not contain arbitration clauses. If this were the case, agreeing to arbitration would not be a prerequisite to gaining access to the securities
market. Therefore, arbitration would not be forced on investors.
On the other hand, it is not clear what percentage of brokerage
houses require pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Most, if not all, brokerage houses at least include arbitration clauses in margin agreements
and discretionary account agreements. 66 Other brokerage houses also
include arbitration clauses in cash account agreements. 67 Furthermore,
because of the recent decisions favoring arbitration, 68 and the advantage
arbitration agreements give to brokers and investors,69 the remaining
brokerage houses will likely require arbitration agreements in the future. This means that the issue of adhesion, if not a present problem,
may become a problem in the future.

2.

Problems with arbitrators

There is a perception that arbitrators are biased in favor of broker-dealers due to the arbitrator's general connection with the securities
industry. 70 "[B]ecause of the background of the arbitrators, the investor
has the impression, frequently justified, that his claims are being judged
by a forum composed of individuals sympathetic to the securities industry and not drawn from the public." 71
In an attempt to ensure the impartiality of the arbitrators, the
64. See id.
65. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 447.
66. /d.; Katsoris, supra note 22, at 292 n.86.
67. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 447.
68. Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hasp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974).
69. F. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 7 (4th Ed. 1985)(cites the "saving of time,
expense, and trouble" as advantages of arbitration over litigation).
70. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Fletcher, supra note 12, at
451.
71. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Uniform Code of Arbitration 72 provides that a majority of the arbitration panel be from outside the securities industry. 73 At first glance, this
provision appears to eliminate any bias on the part of the arbitration
panel. However, the "absence of clear guidelines for qualifying public
arbitrators, . . . and the inclusion in the pool of public arbitrators of
persons with clear affiliations with the securities industrym• certainly
allows some bias to remain. Furthermore, the provision does not eliminate the bias of the members of the arbitration panel selected from
within the securities industry. From a disgruntled investor's point of
view (assuming there is a five person arbitration panel, two selected
from within the industry and three "neutral" outside arbitrators) 75 all
three of the allegedly "neutral" arbitrators must be convinced of his
claim in order for him to succeed. The broker-dealer, who is already
perceived to have two votes from the arbitrators within the securities
industry, need only convince one of the "neutral" arbitrators in order to
defend its position.
Another problem inherent in the arbitration system is that arbitra72. UNIFORM CoDE OF ARBITRATION (as amended), reprinted in Fifth Report of the securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Apr. 1986) (Exhibit C) in RESOLVING SECURITIES DisPUTES: ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION 109 (D. Robins ed. 1986) [hereinafter Uniform Code of
Arbitration].
The Uniform Code of Arbitration developed by the Conference established a uniform
system of arbitration procedures throughout the securities industry. The Code incorporated and harmonized the pre-existing rules of the various self-regulatory organizations. The Code provides for arbitration of disputes between customers and securities
industry organizations and individuals under the auspices of the participating self-regulatory organization selected by the customer.
Fifth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Apr. 1986) in RESOLVING
SECURITIES DISPUTES: ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION 1 11 (D. Robins ed. 1986).
73. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 2. Section 8 of the Uniform Code of Arbitration states:
Except as otherwise provided in this Code, in all arbitration matters involving
public customers, and where the matter in controversy does not exceed the amount or
$500,000, or where the matter in controversy does not involve or disclose a money
claim, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitration panel which shall consist
of no less than three (3) not more than five (5) arbitrators, at least a majority of whom
shall not be from the securities industry, unless the public customer requests a panel
consisting of at least a majority from the securities industry.
In all arbitration matters involving public customers where the amount in controversy is $500,000 or more, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitration
panel which shall consist of five (5) arbitrators, unless the parties agree in writing to a
panel of three (3) arbitrators, at least a majority of whom shall not be a from the
securities industry, unless the public customer requests a panel consisting of at least a
majority from the securities industry.
UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, § 8 (emphasis in original).
74. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 2; see McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2355 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)("[I]t is often possible for the 'public' arbitrators to be attorneys or consultants whose
clients have been exchange members or SROs.").
7 5. See supra note 73.
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tors lack judicial training. 76 Currently, no training is required for arbitrators.77 "[V]irtually no formal training [is given to] arbitrators on
matters relating to either arbitration law, including the scope of arbitrators' authority, relevant state law, or securities law." 78 This objection to securities arbitration was raised by the Court in Wilko 79 and 1s
still valid today.

B.

Procedural Problems With Securities Arbitration

1.

Lack of discovery

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for liberal discovery
between the parties. 80 Broad and flexible discovery ensures that "prior
to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all
relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the information is privileged."81 The same liberal rules of discovery applauded
under the Federal Rules are not generally available 82 in arbitration
proceedings. 83 In fact, discovery is extremely limited in securities arbitration.8• "This is true, 'even though the lack of discovery may be fatal
76. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 4; see, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 12, at 454 (and sources
cited therein).
77. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION supra note 72.
78. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 4.
79. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 ("As the protective provisions of the Securities Act
require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that
Congress must have intended § 14, [of the Securities Act] to apply to waiver of judicial trial and
review.").
80. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81 at 540 (4th ed. 1983) (Rules 26 to 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deal with discovery.).
81. /d.
82. If free to contract, the parties could contract for full disclosure when contracting for
arbitration.
83. Extensive pretrial discovery permitted in the courts (e.g., depositions, written interrogations, bills of particulars, production of documents or things) is not available in
securities arbitration proceedings.... Because such discovery "tools" can be expensive
and burdensome, a stalling tactic, a nuisance, an effort to wear down one's opponent,
and, contrary to the objective of arbitration as an expeditious, cost-effective alternative
to the courts.
Robbins, An Insider's Guide to Securities Arbitration, at 14 (1985) in RESOLVING SECURITIES
DISPUTES: ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION 66 (D. Robins ed. 1986).
84. Section 20 of the Uniform Code of Arbitration as adopted by the securities industry
provides:
(a) The arbitrators and any counsel of record to the proceedings shall have
the power of the subpoena process as provided by law. However, the
parties shall produce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent
possible without resort to the issuance of the subpoena process.
(b) Prior to the first hearing session, the parties shall cooperate in the voluntary exchange of such documents and information as will serve to
expedite the arbitration. If the parties agree, they may also submit ad-
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to a party's case.' " 86 The Uniform Code requires the parties to cooperate in the voluntary disclosure of evidence. 86 If the parties cooperate,
this form of discovery is adequate and probably desirable. However,
because there are no penalties for failure to cooperate, there is no way
to ensure that the parties will cooperate. 87 While the Uniform Code
gives the arbitrators and the parties the power to subpoena documents,88 "[ u]nder existing rules, the documents that a party requests
pursuant to subpoena do not have to be produced until minutes before
a hearing is to begin." 89 The result is that a party may not have
enough time to properly prepare its case. As a practical matter, "the
requestor does not know whether, on the day of the hearing, he is going
to argue over discovery matters only, or whether the arbitrators will
proceed to resolve the case on the merits." 90
The lack of discovery has been cited as an advantage that arbitration has over litigation in that it saves time and money by preventing a
"paper trial." 91 In a given situation, however, an investor may need
substantial discovery to prove the alleged securities violations. Discovery is particularly important in a securities dispute because the brokerdealer generally has, in its possession, much of the evidence of the violations in its files. 92

2.

Lack of a record of the proceedings

The Uniform Code does not require that a mandatory record of
the proceedings be kept. 98 Without a record of the proceedings, judicial
review of the arbitrators' decision is unduly restricted. While the Arbiditional documents to the Director of Arbitration for forwarding to the
arbitrators.
UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, § 20.
85. Katsoris, supra note 22, at 287 n.52 (quoting GoLDBERG, A LAWYERS GUIDE TO CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 3.03, at 40 (2d ed. 1983)).
86. UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, § 20(b).
87. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 9. See generally UNIFORM CoDE OF ARBITRATION, supra
note 72.
88. UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, § 20(a).
89. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 9.
90. /d.
91. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 454.
92. " 'All the documents are in the hands of the broker-dealer,' argues Peter R. Cella, an
attorney for investors and a public member of SICA. 'Some (firms) are a little reluctant to give
documents up, some are downright stonewallers.'" Salwen, Investors Swamp Securities-Arbitration System, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 39, col. 3.
93. Unless requested by the arbitrators or a party or parties to a dispute, no record of
an arbitration proceeding shall be kept. If a record is kept, it shall be a verbatim record. If a party or parties to a dispute elect to have the record transcribed, the cost of
such transcription shall be borne by the party or parties making the request.
UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, at § 25.
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tration Act provides for judicial review of the arbitration proceedings,
review is limited to cases where there has been some kind of misconduct
by the arbitration panel. 94 The lack of a record, inhibiting judicial review of the arbitration proceedings, prohibits the correction of any mistakes and thus fails to ensure the protection of investors.
Moreover, because of the lack of any record of previous arbitration
proceedings, arbitrators cannot be bound by precedent. In fact, arbitrators are discouraged from writing opinions,96 which invites inconsistency in future arbitration decisions. At the present time, the Uniform
Code only requires that a record of the proceedings be made when requested by the arbitrators or one of the parties. 96

C.

The Perception Problem

In McMahon, the Supreme Court found no reason for concern
over the quality of arbitration. 97 It noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission had the power to "ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." 98 This, however, is little solace to those investors who perceive the arbitration system as being
unfair and have been refused the right to use the courts for redress.
While the arbitration system in the securities industry may or may
not be fair to investors, if an investor with a valid claim perceives that
arbitration is unfair, 99 he or she may be less likely to bring the claim to
94. 9 U.S.C. § 10 ( 1982). A Court may review the arbitration proceedings only:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c)
Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d)
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
95. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2354 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]rbitrators are not bound by precedent and are actually discouraged by their association from giving reasons for a decision.").
96. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
97. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
98. /d.
99. "The industry is identified with the arbitration process, which is looked upon as a club
determining the rights of its members." Hoblin, Broker/ Dealer Response to Customer Complaints
in Arbitration, (June 1986) reprinted in RESOLVING SECURITIES DISPUTES: ARBITRATION AND
LITIGATION, Practice Law Institute, 309, 353 (1986). "[T]he investor has the impression, frequently justified, that his claims are being judged by a forum composed of individuals sympathetic
to the securities industry and not drawn from the public." McMahon, 107 U.S. at 2355 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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arbitration. When valid claims are not brought, the purpose of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act-to protect investors-is defeated.
Arbitration must not only be fair in fact, but investors must also perceive the arbitration system to be fair in order for the system as a whole
to protect investors. 100 Both the substantive problems with the securities
arbitration system and the procedural problems previously discussed,
contribute to this "perception problem."

III.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION

In a recent letter to all members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), the SEC acknowledged that there were
deficiencies in the securities arbitration system and recommended
changes to ensure the "fairness and efficiency" of SRO-sponsored arbitration.101 These recommendations were made after an eighteen month
study conducted by the SEC and were deemed necessary as a result of
the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon. 102 The SEC has recognized
that McMahon will make arbitration the "primary forum for the resolution of disputes between broker-dealers and investors." 103 This will
put an increasing demand on a system that was conceived only as an
"alternative dispute resolution mechanism." 104 As discussed earlier in
this article, many problems must be resolved before securities arbitration can adequately protect investors. The SEC's recommendations
solve many of these problems but other problems are either inadequately dealt with or are not considered at all.
A.

Problems That SEC Recommendations Solve

Among the problems that the SEC's recommendations should solve
is the lack of appellate review. The Commission suggests that a record
of the proceedings be kept in order to allow appellate review. 106 It is
also recommended that the arbitrators be required to write a short
opinion of the case including the relevant issues and law. These proposals seem well conceived, certainly needed and should be adopted.
The Commission also realizes there is a problem with discovery in
securities arbitration because no "mechanism to ensure that parties cooperate" in the discovery process exists. 106 The Commission's solution
I 00.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Katsoris, supra note 22, at 279, 310.
SEC Letter, supra note 52, at I.
Id.

ld.
Id.
Id. at 8.
ld. at 9.
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is to involve the arbitrators much more in pre-arbitration discovery. 107
This proposal appears to be a good compromise between discovery allowed under the Federal Rules, which may be time consuming and
costly, and discovery presently allowed in securities arbitration, which
inhibits the investor from preparing his case.

B.

Problems That The SEC Recommendations Do Not Solve

The SEC acknowledges a need for impartial arbitrators in securities arbitration. 108 The Commission's recommendations, however, have
not gone far enough in this area to ensure investor protection. The
main objection from an investor's point of view is that the Commission
continues to endorse arbitration panels that consist of a mix of public
and industry arbitrators. 109 As has been discussed before, allowing for
any number of arbitrators from the securities industry builds bias in
favor of broker-dealers into the arbitration system. If the arbitration
system is to protect investors, no bias toward either party should be
tolerated. To avoid bias, all arbitrators should be chosen from a pool of
public arbitrators who have no affiliation with the securities industry.
The Commission has, however, proposed arbitrator training and
evaluation. The Commission suggests that training can be accomplished
by "institution of a regular newsletter" which would provide general
information and keep arbitrators abreast of new developments in the
law. 110 A comprehensive manual for arbitrators would also be developed which would describe the arbitrator's powers and responsibilities.m These publications along with "instituting a system of written
evaluations" 112 would aid greatly in ensuring arbitrator competence
and should be adopted by the SICA.
The Commission has also voiced concerns about the arbitrator selection process. 113 It is proposed that arbitrators be asked about their
disciplinary history, and specifically, if they have been involved in any
"theft, the taking of a false oath, or fraud." 114 The Commission also
suggests the disclosure of any conflicts of interests on the part of a po107. /d.
108. /d. at 2.
109. Id.
110. /d. at 4.
111. /d.
112. /d. at 5.
113. Section 11 of the Uniform Code of Arbitration deals with the disclosure that is required
of arbitrators. "Each arbitrator shall be required to disclose to the Director of Arbitration any
circumstances which might preclude such arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial
determination." UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 72, § 11.
114. SEC Letter, supra note 52, at 3-4.
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tential arbitrator. 116 Full disclosure by arbitrators is certainly needed
not only for the use of the parties when selecting arbitrators but also
for use when forming a pool of arbitrators to choose from. The fact that
this type of disclosure is not already required is evidence that securities
arbitration is in need of reform.

C.

Problems That Have Not Yet Been Addressed By The SEC

Among the problems not addressed by the Commission is the concern over adhesion contacts. The perceived unfairness brought about by
the use of adhesion contracts could easily be remedied if broker-dealers
were required to give investors the choice to either include or exclude
arbitration clauses in their contracts. If investors were allowed to bargain freely for arbitration when contracting with broker-dealers, the
voluntary aspect usually associated with arbitration would be preserved
in securities arbitration.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decision in McMahon, makes it clear that
pre-dispute arbitration agreements between brokers and investors are
enforceable. Following McMahon the use of arbitration has increased,
putting much more responsibility on the securities arbitration system.
Because arbitration is quickly becoming the only recourse investors
have against securities violations by broker-dealers, the securities arbitration system must be reevaluated to determine whether or not the
system adequately ensures investor protection.
At the present time, problems, both real and perceived, have cast
doubts about the fairness of the securities arbitration system. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority and the duty to
guarantee the adequacy of arbitration. It is now up to the Commission
to correct these problems, thus ensuring the system's integrity and protecting investors.

Mark Jay Linderman

115. /d. at 5-6.

